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Toward Humanistic Theories
ofLegalJustice
Robin West
In an oft-quoted aside, Justice Holmes once remarked that when
lawyers in his courtroom make appeal to justice, he stops listening: such
appeals do nothing but signal that the lawyer has neither the facts nor law
on his side, or worse, that he is ignorant of whatever law might be rele-
vant. 1 Holmes's remark has not gone unheeded. Wary of seeming igno-
rant or without argument, legal scholars, legal educators, lawyers, and
judges have apparently chosen to forego the task of articulating concepts
of justice that might enlighten or guide the work of adjudication.
Holmes, in effect, chided us out of it. Holmes's legacy, in part, is precise-
ly this lapse: we don't have, or teach, a guiding theory oflegal justice, nor
do we have, or teach, a family of competing theories of legal justice, that
might inform our work in law, at least as that work continues to focus on
the work of courts. Nor do we have, consequently, a specifically human-
istic conception of legal justice that might move adjudication in a direc-
tion conducive to the well-being and just social arrangements of the
speCies.
There are, of course, two striking exceptions to this general claim.
Working in part off a Holmesian legacy, Richard Posner and other like-
minded legal economists have persuaded a sizeable percentage of two gen-
erations of lawyers that justice is wealth and wealth justice, and that this
is basically all they need to know: with justice so defined, and a few ana-
lytic tools, virtually any legal problem that may confront a common law
judge yields a more or less definite and wealth-maximizing solution.2 The
judge interested in pursuing justice, and the lawyer interested in practic-
ing it, need only seek the wealth-maximizing resolution of any legal
dilemma. And, Ronald Dworkin, around the same period of time con-
vinced a sizeable percentage of the same group of lawyers that justice is
not essentially distinct from law itself, at least when read in the best pos-
sible light. Justice is law, one might say, and law justice, and that is all we
need to know.3 The judge interested in pursuing justice, and the lawyer
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interested in practicing it, should seek and will find it in the law itself-
there is no meaningful moral norm, independent of the legal materials, to
which he or she might turn for guidance.
There are familiar problems with both the Dworkinian and Posnerian
reduction of justice to law on the one hand and wealth on the other: a
law, a legal system, a legal pronouncement, a statute or a constitution,
might be terribly unjust, in which case the romantic Dworkinian identi-
fication of justice with law generously understood will do little but blind
us to state-sponsored injustice, and the simple pronouncement to maxi-
mize wealth, although it unquestionably quenches a thirst for certainty,
might frustrate rather than serve the ends of a just order, in which case
justice surely cannot be equated with wealth. I do not wish to rehearse or
expand these objections here. All I want to stress is the simple point that
these highly problematic, counter-intuitive, and, in some cases, seeming-
ly cruel understandings are the only theories of legal justice - the justice
that courts and lawyers and judges are committed to pursue - that have
emerged, so to speak, from a point ofview internal to the profession itself,
and that accordingly might serve the needs of the profession. They have
dominated the discussion to the extent that they have only because nature
abhors a vacuum. Nevertheless, for all their power, and even given the
dearth of alternatives, the Dworkinian and Posnerian understandings of
justice, stated in their starkest and truest terms, have failed to persuade all
but a few of us.
For those of us - probably the majority - unpersuaded that justice
can or should be reduced to either the extant law, even generously read,
or wealth, even ecumenically defined, the fallback position is essentially
Holmesian. We discuss other regulative ideas - fairness, equity, efficien-
cy, integrity, or, more grandly, equality or liberty - but the imperative of
justice, that which a court or judge must do in order to be just, is hon-
ored only by our embarrassed failure to engage its command. This failure,
in turn, has both existential and instrumental costs.
We come to law, many of us, to explore justice; furthermore, and
more basically, we define our lives by this virtue. What we find when we
get there is no consensus on what legal justice might mean or require.
That alone, of course, is hardly cause for alarm. What is alarming, how-
ever, is that we find not only a lack of consensus but also that there is vir-
tually no debate. There is no tradition, no shared fabric, no mosaic, no
148
HeinOnline -- 10 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 149 1998
family of competing understandings, of what the virtue that for many of
us seemingly defines our professional lives might entail. This prompts
ennui, resignation, and, in our students, a cynicism we deplore but have
no clue how to address in a way that does not expose our own.
The instrumental damage occasioned by our collective refusal to
engage the issue is worse. The aspirations of the United States for the
western rule of law are boundless: we are in the process of covering not
only our country but increasingly the world with a conception of adju-
dicative law pointed only to the interconnected virtues of corporate
wealth, individual decisional liberty, and, when not trumped by the uni-
versalist mandate of wealth, of moral and cultural relativism. The cost of
our failure is ultimately the globalization of an understanding of the point
of adjudicated law peculiarly unhinged from its defining virtue.
I view the contemporary interdisciplinary Law and Literature
Movement, of which Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature is a founda-
tional part, as an attempt to respond to this need. Justice, as Marianne
Constable has recently reminded US,4 has always been a defining object of
study of the humanities, and justice, we should remind ourselves, has
always in some sense been the object or point of law and adjudication
both. It is entirely natural to turn to the former to enlighten the latter. We
need to rid ourselves of the twenty-five year optimistic belief that we can
find in our deepest legal structures themselves a full understanding of the
demands of justice, and we need to rid ourselves of the dreary belief that
we can in our quest for profit find all we need to know to understand the
nature of the good. But we also need to shed the stultifying skeptical and
Holmesian claim that the question of justice is unbroachable, and the
urge to answer it childish. The Law and Literature Movement, as I under-
stand it, is definitively committed to the exploration of humanistic mean-
ings of justice. The Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature, under Richard
Weisberg's direction, has contributed immeasurably to that work. I have
felt honored over the last ten years to be associated with it.
1 Quoted from a letter to Dr, Wu, collected in H, Shriver, ed" Oliver Wendell Holmes: His
Book Notices and Uncollected Papers (936), p. 201.
2 Richard Posner, The Economics o/Justice (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1981).
149
HeinOnline -- 10 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 150 1998
3 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Havard University Press, 1978).
4 Plenaty Comments at the Law, Culture and Humanities Conference, 1998, Georgetown
Law Center.
150
